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Introduction
On October 26, 2009, Evan Frustaglio, a seemingly healthy 13-year-old boy, died in Ottawa, Canada from H1N1, just as Canadian health services were starting their vaccination programs.
His death featured prominently in the news media. Within hours, parents rushed to get their children vaccinated (The children still wait 2009). Despite having encouraged people for months to receive the vaccine, governments and health services appeared unprepared for a surge in demand; long line-ups formed in front of clinics across the country (Canadian Medical Association et al. 2010) . The limited supply of vaccine meant that most provinces chose to administer vaccines to priority groups only, which further aggravated the situation. In the aftermath there were different views on who was to blame-if anyone-for long line-ups and anxious parents.
The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) foregrounds that in October 2009 78% of
Canadians believed "the media hyped and exaggerated the threat of H1N1 " (2010: 55) . This fact exposes a paradox: if people were confident the media exaggerated the threat, why was there such a surge in demand for the vaccine? Despite considerable attention, many questions about H1N1 and social responses to it remain unresolved (Grube 2013; Liang 2011; Waterer, Hui and Jenkins 2010; Fineberg 2014 ).
The purpose of this paper is to examine claims that media exaggerated the threat of H1N1. We explore four main questions. First, how do people experience and respond to risk?
Secondly, was media coverage of H1N1 unusual? Thirdly, and as a corollary to the previous question, how were governments depicted by the media? In other words, what did the media criticize the Canadian governments about? Finally, what lessons does this episode provide for health care officials about media and managing responses to uncertain risks? Before addressing our four questions, we will provide a brief overview of H1N1 in Canada in 2009.
H1N1 in Canada
Timely information is important when responding to communicable diseases. Because people are increasingly mobile, disease surveillance must span large geographic areas, yet remain timely, accurate and comprehensive. Outbreak detection is complex; data must flow up and down organizational hierarchies. In Canada, this challenge is complicated by the fact that provincial and federal governments share responsibility for health, and it is not always clear where the line is drawn between the two orders of government (Deber 2014: 10) . Even within provincial jurisdiction, there are a variety of institutional arrangements over public health and pandemic response (Deber 2014: 13-14) . Many provinces have subdivided health responsibilities into regional authorities, which may not correspond to municipal boundaries. The responsibilities of these authorities vary across the country. These complex arrangements generate challenges, including externalities, unfunded mandates, and data ownership and coordination issues (Macdougall, et al. 2014 ). In addition, circumstances change; pandemics can spread or contract. Macdougall, et al. 2014) . Naylor noted that coordination problems during SARS were part of a long history of inadequate public health infrastructure to support coordinated responses to national health emergencies. The commissions variously noted a lack of integration of emergency-related data, information-sharing infrastructure, data quality and reporting standards, emergency response coordination, and agreement on a common list of notifiable or reportable diseases across jurisdictions (Macdougall 2014 ).
H1N1 first occurred in Canada when four students from Nova Scotia and two men from British Columbia returned to Canada from Mexico (Manitoba Health 2010). In total, 8,507 people were hospitalized for influenza (both H1N1 and seasonal), compared to 2,614 in typical flu seasons (Picard 2010) . In all, 428 people died of H1N1. In contrast, approximately 8,000 died in 2007-08 due to seasonal flu and pneumonia (Public Health Agency of Canada 2010). H1N1 affected young people at an unusually high rate; in the early stages of the illnesses' spread, the median age of patients was 18 (Alphonso and Galloway 2009) . This low median age indicates a very serious influenza.
In April 2009 (following the start of the first wave of H1N1 in Canada), the federal government launched a public awareness campaign. Health officials anticipated that the second The plan for vaccine administration changed over time. In early fall 2009, H1N1 was not as wide a threat as health officials had anticipated; as a result, health officials decided to delay vaccination to give more time for trials and vaccine production. From September to mid-October 2009, vaccine demand was low; polls suggested apathy (Mittelstaedt 2009 ). In late October, there was a surge in demand just as there was a problem with supply (Nova Scotia Department of Health and Wellness 2010) . The surge in demand occurred immediately after the death of Evan Frustaglio, which received considerable media attention. Production problems caused a shortage, which created a "rush" for the vaccine; health officials in most provinces resorted to administering it only to priority groups (Public Health Agency of Canada 2010: 73), e.g., children and pregnant women. In early December the supply increased and the vaccine was once again available to the general public. There were vaccination queues, but apathy returned and governments were again trying to convince people to get the vaccine. Ultimately about 45% of In the conclusion, the report notes:
there is a need to plan for different scales of pandemic response, dependent on the severity of the virus but recognizing that, even when there is a lower risk of morbidity and mortality with certain strains of a pandemic influenza, there will always be tragic cases that may move public opinion and therefore must be accounted for in a low-risk pandemic situation (Public Health Agency of Canada 2010: 92).
The report concludes that all health-related government agencies in all orders of government must improve their science communication to various audiences, including the media and general public, though it gives no indication of how to do this or which audiences in particular.
Preventative Health Care
Despite evidence that preventative health care can be an effective use of resources in many instances (Wyden, Harkin and Whitehouse 2014) , it is difficult to secure commitment to it.
Fineberg (2013) notes many challenges that work against broad-based acceptance and action of preventative health care: it is difficult to prove conclusively that it is successful; when it is successful, one might describe it as a 'quiet' success, that occurs over time; in other words, it lacks the drama that generates media coverage and public attention; moreover, rewards of preventative health care are delayed, and are not accrued necessarily to the payer; professional 8 advice can be inconsistent; and permanent, long-term (and unpopular) behavior change may be required.
When it comes to their health, people do not necessarily make rational decisions. Our biases impact our ability to perceive risk accurately. Risk perception can be influenced by a sense of dread (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein. 1982) , personal control (Langer 1975) , familiarity (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) , exit options (Starr 1969) , equitable sharing of both benefits and risks (Finucane et al. 2000,) and the potential to blame an institution or person (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) . It can also be associated with how a person feels about something, such as a particular technology or a disease (Alhakami and Slovic 1994) . People also show confirmation bias (Wason 1960 ) and can be vulnerable to 'probability neglect' (Slovic et al. 2005) . When probability neglect is at work, "people's attention is focused on the bad outcome itself, and they are inattentive to the fact that it is unlikely to occur" (Sunstein 2003: 122) .
Indeed, psychologists have noted that the reporting of one death can have a greater emotional impact than reporting multiple deaths if the single victim is depicted on his or her own; the photo of the individual on his own can have the effect of suppressing our ability to use probabilities to place the event in broader perspective (Slovic 2011; Kearney 2013) .
Risk Experience and Response
For our analysis, we categorize H1N1 as an "uncertain risk" (Renn 2008 ). According to Renn (2008) , uncertain risks are risks where the influencing factors are largely known, but the likelihood of any adverse effects cannot be precisely described (e.g., terrorism, rare natural disasters, pandemics). He stresses that uncertain risks require reflective discourse by experts and key stakeholders about balancing the possibilities of over-and under-protection. Despite Renn's focus on risk communication, he offers little on the media's role in framing uncertain risks for a lay audience. This is surprising since most people base their perceptions of risk on information from the media (Fischhoff 1985 (Fischhoff , 1995 Kitzinger and Reilly 1997) .
The government depends on the media in risk events. As we saw with H1N1, this can be a challenge when the media and the public are moved by a singular, tragic event. At the same time, simply declaring that the media "hyped and exaggerated the threat of H1N1" is arguably blame-shifting and naïve. Government plays an important role in setting public expectations; if it fails to meet those expectations it jeopardizes its own credibility and the credibility of its pandemic plan. Government must therefore anticipate amplified media coverage of uncertain risks and cope better with it. Otherwise, important vulnerabilities remain.
Media reactions to the events in late October 2009 expose the scope of the challenge when addressing uncertain risks. While the novelty of one death may initially attract attention, the death of one person does not change the probability that one is going to develop a disease.
This rationale for risk, however, depends on a rational actor paradigm in which probability and consequence are objective and (reasonably) obtainable measures (Jaeger et al. 2001) , which is not the case with uncertain risks. While the PHAC report refers to the challenge of communicating low morbidity pandemics to lay audiences, governments at the time of the pandemic gave mixed messages. The PHAC report highlights, for instance, that as late as August 2009, the federal Minister of Health declared, "What may come this fall is something that could test all of us, possibly to a limit we have never experienced" (Public Health Agency of Canada
2010: 47).
A psychometric approach to risk provides more insight into the effect of media than a rational one. The media tends to report the dramatic over the common but more dangerous (Soumerai, Ross-Degnan and Kahn 1992) . They tend not only to sensationalize (Johnson and Cavello 1987) , but to sensationalize the most negative aspects of events (Wahlberg and Sjoberg 2000) . Media connects with people at an emotional level.
A particularly powerful moment in the H1N1 episode in Canada was the death of Frustaglio just as the vaccine was released. Sociologists have focused on how the media stage and amplify death and grief and the social context in which it is interpreted. The moral panics literature (Cohen 1972; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1999) examines episodes that include broad social concern, disproportionate response and volatile public opinion. Moral panics also encompass an element of the "taboo" -such as the death of a child. According to Walter, Littlewood and Pickering (1995) , media plays a crucial role in interpreting and staging death scenes for public consumption. According to Weaver and Jackson (2012) , child deaths are frequently interpreted through the lens of maternal grief, exploiting its emotional and symbolic significance. There is also a 'utopian bias' that underpins most coverage -no child should ever die prematurely. Mitchell et al. (2012) note that the death of a child is one of the most disruptive and profound types of loss; it produces deep, intense and prolonged grief, particularly in affluent societies. In the West, the death of a child is "an unspeakable contravention of the 'natural' order of things, particularly in 'modern' society" (14).
The rational ordering of public bureaucracies is ill-equipped to deal with these circumstances. Their interest in fairness, regulation and process cannot easily accommodate problems of profound human grief. Many of these emotionally charged events in which media and social commentators rush to impose meaning lead to a selective search for accountability and an eagerness to lay blame. The Columbia Journalism Review (1979) notes that issues involving children are often "ambiguous, complicated and touchy," and that stories about kids can be 11 "nasty, intrusive and potentially sensational" (p.3, as cited in Hennink-Kaminski and Dougall 2009). More generally, in reference to crises and disasters, Pidgeon argues that "despite the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the environments within which large-scale hazards arise and the systemic nature of breakdowns in safety, cultural myths of control over affairs ensure that a culprit must be found after a disaster or crisis has unfolded" (1997: 9). In other words, while the death of Frustaglio generated the initial coverage, an aggressive and selective hunt for a culprit was likely to follow.
Method for Media Analysis
The volume of H1N1 media coverage was from 3 to 10 times greater than the volume of media coverage of other low probability / high consequence events (see, for example, Quigley and Finally, while we recognize there are differences between these countries (e.g., proximity to
Mexico where the pandemic started), H1N1 was largely the same problem at the same time.
These similarities allow us to control many extraneous variables in our comparison, which is generally difficult to do with low probability / high consequence events in different countries. In January 2011 we retrieved 819 articles about H1N1. We used Factiva to search a leading national newspaper in each country. Our intention was to examine volatility and variation among these newspapers. We acknowledge that 1) media sources have their own political and ideological biases, and market orientation, which may affect their coverage and limit comparative methods, 2) we have only selected one newspaper from each country, which limits our capacity to generalize (it would be useful, for example, to examine how the G&M's coverage compared with coverage in the National Post, the Toronto Star and La Presse 4 ), and 3) examining the role of social media in communicating about the spread of pandemics could Source: Edelman (2015) 5 6 .
For our analysis, we selected the most widely distributed national broadsheet in each country. Our sample comprises all articles in the year following April 25, 2009, that included the term(s) most commonly used to refer to the event. We eliminated any articles that were not principally about H1N1. Content analysis of the articles was carried out in two stages. First, we reviewed articles to determine whether key actors were assessed positively, negatively or neutrally (N/A was also an option). We assigned a value of +1, -1, or 0 to each article depending on whether it was on balance a positive, negative, or neutral assessment for each key sector. We then calculated the net sum. Each order of government 7 was assessed separately (if one article had a negative assessment of both the federal and provincial government, then it was assessed -2).
5 Survey 200 college-educated respondents, aged 25-64, in top 25% of household income who report significant media consumption and engagement in business news and public policy (Edelman 2015) . 6 Traditional denotes print or broadcast media; hybrid media denotes online versions of traditional media sources (e.g. The Huffington Post); owned media denotes a brand or company website; social media denotes sites with user shared/generated content (e.g. Twitter) (Edelman n.d.) 14
We reduced bias in our assessments using several strategies. We assessed all the H1N1 articles during a short period of time: January and February 2011. We also applied a standard template to all articles. One researcher classified articles for each newspaper. To ensure consistency, the research group met to review a sample of articles together before and during the assessment process. To test the inter-rater reliability of our coding, 10% of articles were double coded; using Cohen's kappa coefficient we found an inter-rater reliability agreement of k=.66 for performance assessment. This corresponds to a substantial level of agreement.
Following this initial assessment, we created a three-by-three matrix to assess what the governments were criticized for. First, we used a cybernetic definition of control (informationgathering, standard-setting, and behavior modification; see Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001) .
For the second dimension of the matrix, we adopted the three justifications of Hood and
Jackson's (1991) administrative argument (sigma (efficiency) justifications, theta (fairness and accountability) justifications, and lambda (stability and learning) justifications). Circumstance guides which administrative argument we employ to criticize government performance (e.g. an issue of efficiency, if identified previously in a similar risk event, could also be categorized as a failure of stability and learning). In all cases, reviewers were instructed to choose the best fit.
Once we had created the categories, one reviewer analyzed the 339 relevant H1N1 articles in the G&M. The review occurred from December 2013 -January 2014. Once again, we used
Cohen's kappa coefficient to determine whether there was significant bias in the reviewer's analysis; we found a high level of agreement (see Table 3 ). 
Media Coverage of H1N1
While the volume and distribution of coverage in the news sources were similar prior to
Frustaglio's death, there was some variation. After an initial peak in coverage through July, the While the domestic health sector tended to receive neutral assessments and a relatively small mix of positive and negative assessments, which netted to zero, assessments of governments varied more dramatically. The G&M included several negative assessments of government (-82); the DT and Australian had moderately negative assessments (-23 and -27, respectively) . Figure 3 shows performance assessments of governments in each of the three newspapers. In the G&M, 63% of the negative assessments can be attributed to the federal government and 37% to the provinces. In comparative perspective, media coverage in the G&M was unusual. Whether this was due to an overzealous G&M, an over-anxious population or a poorly prepared government response is unclear. 
G&M Criticisms of Canadian Government
Of the 339 articles in the G&M, 48% (161) included negative performance assessments of governments. There are 201 negative performance assessments in total. We categorized criticisms according to cybernetic control and the administrative argument that journalists used to frame their criticisms (see Table 4 ). The most common criticism concerned the intersection between behaviour modification and stability and learning, constituting 32% (64) of the total.
Efficiency and behaviour modification (28) and each of the three argument types concerning standard setting (32, 32 and 27) ranged from 16 to 13% of the total negative performance assessments. These criticisms might be grouped as the second most common. Few criticisms concerned information-gathering, which is particularly ironic given its importance to public health initiatives. To detect variations in negative performance assessments over time, we divided the G&M's coverage into four periods: before the first wave (April 25 to May 3); the first wave
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(May 4 to July 31); the interim period (August 1 to September 30); and the second wave (October 1 to April 25). Standard setting and behaviour modification are very similar throughout the entire episode although behaviour modification passes standard setting during the second wave. As noted, information-gathering gets little attention. When we consider which administrative argument is used to frame criticism (figure 4) we see that the majority are framed as criticisms of stability and learning. From the interim period onward, however, criticisms are framed less as criticisms of stability and learning and more as efficiency concerns. In short, there seem to be two distinct periods in the criticisms: what Renn would call the knowledge generation stage, which is concerned largely with learning, and the implementation stage, which is concerned with stability, learning and efficiency. This growing concern over efficiency can be detected before the death of Frustaglio. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Uncertain risks create communication challenges for health officials. Their inability to predict the likelihood of events within a narrow range -as well as to articulate the possible consequences -conveys knowledge gaps from which people can draw the wrong inferences; these inferences can lead to exaggerated concern and heightened anxiety. Arguably, Frustaglio's death reframed the H1N1 story from a pandemic that was under control or not particularly threatening to one which could prove fatal to healthy youth. This reframing affects all stages in Renn's risk governance framework: social concern increased; tolerance and acceptability decreased;
circumstances required a risk management process that was adaptive and immediate. In essence, the problem health officials were addressing before Frustaglio's death changed after his death.
The governments and their plan were in a highly vulnerable position: they had been strongly encouraging people to receive the vaccine but now the governments did not have enough. H1N1
shows both the volatility of media coverage around uncertain risks, and the consequences of this volatility. Media coverage cannot easily be predicted but it can have considerable impact on demand for public services. Coverage can also be highly negative of government performance, which can undermine credibility in the governments' plan. For these reasons governments must carefully consider how to prepare for high volume, volatile media coverage. Here, we suggest lessons governments might draw from H1N1.
First, governments should recognize the role they play in influencing how media and populations respond to messages concerning uncertain risks. For months, governments had contributed to heightening awareness of H1N1. There was a large public bureaucracy working on pandemic response since SARS in 2003 (Liang 2011) . As noted, H1N1 communications included press conferences, alert notices, brochures, downloads and a website. While PHAC 21 implies the media over-reacted to H1N1, evidence suggests that the governments reacted strongly also, as the PHAC report attests. Leadership also matters. Our media analysis shows that the heath sector received much more favourable coverage than governments. Medical practitioners are trusted more than elected officials and civil servants (Freed et al. 2011) . Crisis response led by political figures can generate more negative coverage (Eisenman et al. 2007 ): the motives and competence of politicians are suspect, and members of opposition parties may attack the position of elected officials for political gain. This erodes trust in the process (Kramer, 1999; Hardin 2006) . Notwithstanding their formal constitutional duties and barring more controversial policy decisions, governments should be seen to support -not lead -those working on the frontline. The public is less likely to doubt the knowledge, competence and motives of health professionals, which is crucial to establishing trust (Peters, Covello and McCallum 1997) .
Second, governments should be sensitive to powerful stories. While the death of 
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The communications challenge is significant. Government cannot dismiss the emotional weight of a child's death. While the death may not tell us much about the probability of a disease spreading, it has a strong emotional impact and will likely draw media attention. Government must address consequence and probability separately. Third, government should be more sensitive to the different response stages with uncertain risk. In the early stages, criticisms were framed as stability and learning criticisms, relating to capacity to learn and adapt, even in adverse conditions. While these criticisms remained high throughout, we saw a rise in efficiency criticisms from August onward. There may be a temptation with uncertain risks to focus on learning, with optimism that we can understand better the problem and maintain a stable operation. As the second wave approached, however, there was concern over operational effectiveness. Government needs to be aware of how and when to move beyond the knowledge generation phase of the risk governance process to the decisions and implementation of actions phase. Measures of success in operational and learning phases are not the same. Governments could establish more rigorous independent oversight to comment on work-in-progress during the different stages of an operation; there is evidence that in other jurisdictions there was such scrutiny. 10 The G&M coverage suggests that there were operational problems and that they pre-dated Frustaglio's death.
The best way to address increased demand for health services is with an effective response that meets public expectations. In the absence of data to help health officials be more specific about the magnitude of the risk, government should employ a precautionary approach, particularly when harm is potentially catastrophic or irreversible (Sunstein 2009 ). Uncertain risks
2009) assessing pandemic preparations to facilitate the transition from the knowledge generation phase to the decisions and implementation phase.
also require government to avoid vulnerability. It is, however, unrealistic for a pandemic plan to dictate constant availability of sufficient human resources to respond to worst case scenarios.
Adaptive capacity and a diversity of means to accomplish mission-critical tasks are necessary.
Future scenario exercises are a good way to increase adaptive capacity. Uncertain risks, in particular, can benefit from scenario exercises because the external driving forces (supply and demand of vaccines) are neither predictable nor under the complete control of health authorities Finally, government needs to get better at getting it wrong. The PHAC report claims that the media hyped and exaggerated the threat of H1N1. This claim is unsettling because the report side-steps, however gently, the responsibility that health-related government agencies have to anticipate media coverage and incorporate it into their plan. Because of our limited knowledge 25 with uncertain risks, we may misinterpret early warning signs, over-(and under-) react and give bad advice. Governments need an organizational culture that supports action in the face of uncertainty and learning in uncertain situations. Political culture is not conducive to this type of risk-taking; again, letting the health sector lead may generate better results.
It would be disconcerting if government approached the next health crisis with a distrust of the media. This distrust would inevitably lead to less transparency, which would further erode trust in government process (Kramer 1999) . Civil servants would become more nervous about engaging with the media knowing the potentially negative consequences of a high dread message amplified by the media. Rather, government should work to understand the incentive structures and the biases in media coverage and public reaction to it, particularly during a highly emotive and volatile event, and account for these features in government pandemic planning. Ultimately, government will still need media to help communicate its message. The rise of social media makes the need for adaptive capacity in the health sector even greater. Next time, the pandemic may be more severe and, like in Australia in 2009, we may have considerably less lead time.
